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Summary
In March 1998, the Senate began consideration of a  resolution giving the Senate's
advice and consent to protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty admitting  Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic to NATO. The Senate is expected to resume consideration of
the resolution in April 1998. A prominent issue in the Congressional debate has been the
impact of enlargement on relations with Russia. In an effort to assuage Russian concerns
over enlargement, on May 27, 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President Clinton
and leaders of other NATO countries signed a “Founding Act” on Russia-NATO
relations. The accord sets up a Russia-NATO consultative council and reiterates NATO
assurances that nuclear weapons and significant numbers of new troops will not be
deployed to new NATO member states.  Many Members of Congress have expressed
support for the Founding Act, but some are concerned that the pact could dilute NATO
if it is badly implemented.  Others feel that NATO enlargement may push Russia into an
irrational confrontation with its neighbors or the West.  This report will be updated as
events warrant.
Russian Policy toward NATO Enlargement 
Since NATO countries began serious consideration of enlargement, Russian political
leaders across the political spectrum, from pro-Western democrats to centrists to
Communists and extreme nationalists, have been strongly opposed to NATO enlargement.
This anti-enlargement consensus permeates all government institutions, from President
Yeltsin’s staff to the foreign and defense ministries to virtually all factions of the Russian
parliament.  Only a handful of democrats, such as former Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev, criticize the anti-NATO enlargement consensus that has developed.  Opinion
polls have shown that many ordinary Russians oppose NATO enlargement as well, but that
the issue pales in significance when compared to the challenges of their own economic
situations.  According to a April 1997 USIA poll, a substantial majority of Russians
express opposition to NATO enlargement, but few of them have really focused on the
issue, despite a steady drumbeat of official criticism of enlargement.  Of those polled, 69%
have heard or read “not very much” or “nothing at all” about NATO.  Of the minority who
claimed to be fairly well-informed about NATO, 62% expressed opposition to
enlargement, 18% supported enlargement and 20% were unsure.
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Since 1994, Russia’s policy has been to denounce enlargement, warn of its negative
impact on Russia’s relations with the West, and threaten specified or unspecified
countermeasures.  Some of these threatened measures included non-ratification of the
START II treaty, abrogation of the CFE Treaty, increased defense spending, stationing
of tactical nuclear weapons on Russia’s borders, targeting new NATO members with
strategic nuclear weapons, establishing a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
defense union or at least a Russia-Belarus defense union, and forging alliances with China,
India, Iran or other countries.  By using these tactics, Russian officials apparently hoped
to convince some European NATO countries that enlargement could spark renewed
confrontation with Moscow.  At the very least, it was hoped that adopting a tough stance
would provide Moscow maximum leverage in possible Russia-NATO negotiations on
enlargement.  It was also hoped that the process of initial NATO enlargement could be
made so painful that NATO would not try a second round of it.  In the opinion of at least
some observers, many of these threats may lack credibility.  Some threatened
countermeasures could hurt Russia as much if not more than the West (such as abrogation
of some arms control treaties).  Russia may currently be too weak to carry out such
measures as increasing defense spending or forging a CIS defense union. In still other
cases, Russia may undertake the “countermeasure” whether or not NATO enlarges
(Russia-Belarus integration and the non-ratification of START II, for example).   
As enlargement looked increasing inevitable, Russia sought to set conditions for its
grudging acquiescence to the move.  In March 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yegeni
Primakov asked for legally-binding guarantees that no nuclear weapons, foreign forces,
or any NATO military infrastructure would be moved onto the territory of new members.
Russia also reportedly sought a commitment that NATO would not conduct a second
wave of enlargement, or would at least postpone it for a very long time.  In September
1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher endorsed the concept of an accord to create
the foundation for cooperation between an enlarged NATO and Russia.  NATO approved
the idea in December 1996, and NATO-Russia talks on the proposed document began in
January 1997.  At the Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on March
20-21, 1997, President Yeltsin dropped Russia’s demand for a legally binding treaty,
settling for a political document signed by the heads of state of the NATO countries and
Russia.
The Russia-NATO Founding Act
After several more weeks of  negotiations, Russia and NATO reached an agreement
on a “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and
the Russian Federation,” which was signed by President Yeltsin, President Clinton and the
leaders of other NATO member states on May 27, 1997.  The document establishes a
“NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council” to “provide a mechanism for consultations,
coordination, and to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions
and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.”  The document says
consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States
or Russia.”  It adds that the Founding Act does not “provide NATO or Russia, in any way,
with a right of veto over the actions of the other...”  The Permanent Joint Council will
meet at the level of foreign ministers and defense ministers twice a year and at the level of
ambassadors monthly.  The Council will be chaired jointly by representatives of Russia,
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NATO and a rotating representative of NATO member governments.  Council working
groups and committees may be set up to deal with specific issues.
The Founding Act outlines many areas for possible NATO-Russia cooperation.
These include conflict prevention; peacekeeping operations, Russian participation in the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace; exchange of information
on strategy, defense policy, military doctrine and military budgets; arms control; nuclear
safety; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; “possible cooperation in Theatre
Missile Defense”; air traffic safety; “possible armaments-related cooperation”; defense
conversion; civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief; terrorism and drug
trafficking, and other areas.
A particularly important section of the Founding Act deals with nuclear weapons and
conventional weapons deployments in new NATO member states.  The Founding Act says
that NATO member states “reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members...and do not foresee any future
need to do so.”  The document adds that NATO “has no intention, no plan and no reason
to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory” of new members or to refurbish
old Soviet ones left over from the Warsaw Pact.  
On the issue of conventional forces, the Act calls for the adaption of the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, including “a significant lowering” of treaty limited
equipment levels for all parties to the Treaty.  The Act says that CFE adaptation should
also “enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification...”
The Act also says that “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security
environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by
ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather
than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.  Accordingly it will
have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks.  In this
context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in defense against a threat of
aggression,” peacekeeping missions, or military exercises.  Russia pledged to engage in
similar restraint in the deployment of its armed forces.  The Founding Act does not spell
out details of CFE adaptation proposals, which are being discussed at separate talks. 
The first meeting of the Permanent Joint Council took place on July 18, 1997.
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and
the other NATO foreign ministers participated in the first ministerial-level meeting in New
York on September 26, 1997.  There have been many subsequent PJC meetings at various
levels.  Among the many issues discussed so far have been Russia-NATO cooperation in
Bosnia and Hercegovina, Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace program, and
the adaption of the CFE and Open Skies treaties.
Possible Impact of NATO Enlargement on Russia's Relations with the
West
It is uncertain what long-term impact NATO enlargement will have on Russia’s
relationship with the West.  Optimistic Western observers believe that Russia’s currently
mistrustful view of NATO will gradually change as the habit of cooperation with NATO
takes hold, for example in the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council and in joint
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peacekeeping missions.  However, few Russian observers have publicly expressed such
optimism.  Foreign Minister Primakov has spoken of the Founding Act as a way to
minimize the damage of NATO enlargement to Russia-NATO relations.  NATO
enlargement may be viewed by Russian elites as the clearest sign yet that the West is not
really interested in an equal partnership with Russia, particularly if Russia’s views of its
security interests in Europe do not correspond with what the West feels they should be.
One area of particular concern may be a possible second wave of NATO enlargement to
include the Baltic states, which are eagerly seeking NATO membership.  Although the
Founding Act confirms both sides’ respect for countries’ “inherent right to choose the
means to ensure their own security,” President Yeltsin said to members of the Russian
parliament on May 19, 1997 that if the Baltic states are admitted to NATO, Russia could
revise its policy of cooperation with the alliance.
However, even if Russian elites draw a negative conclusion from enlargement, it may
not have the catastrophic effects on Russia’s relations with the West often forecast by
Russian officials and analysts. To many observers, Yeltsin’s top priority is to push
economic reforms forward.  To do this, Russia will have to continue to rely on
international financial institutions, in which the United States and other leading countries
play important roles, and, increasingly, on Western direct investment and capital markets.
In any case, in its currently weakened state, Russia lacks the resources to start a new Cold
War with the West; and it would find very few allies to support a confrontational stand.
Nevertheless, growing Russian disillusionment with the West could increase Russia’s
current tendency to show its independence from the West whenever possible, without
risking a fundamental break. 
Implementation of the Founding Act may ease Russia-NATO tensions over
enlargement in the short term, but differing views over the nature of the new Russia-
NATO relationship as outlined in the Founding Act may create problems in the future. In
the short term, the Founding Act may be useful to Russian leaders because it gives them
political cover for having been unable to stop NATO enlargement.  However, to be truly
useful from Russia's point of view, the PJC would have to give Russia a de facto power
of co-decision with NATO on important European security issues.  U.S. and NATO
officials have stressed that Russia will have no veto power over NATO decisions.  If
NATO takes important European security decisions on its own, despite Russian objections
at the PJC and elsewhere, Russian leaders could come under fire from domestic opponents
for allegedly have been "duped by NATO again."  Russia could then  lose interest in the
Founding Act and the PJC.
The most pessimistic scenario for Russia's response to enlargement would involve the
discrediting of reformers and the eventual rise to power of leaders hostile to the West.
NATO enlargement would not likely cause such a change in leadership, given the Russian
public’s relative lack of interest in the issue, but could form part of these leaders’
“indictment” against reformers.  An anti-reform coalition of Communists, nationalists,
disgruntled military and security officers and defense industrialists might see domestic
political benefits in trying to isolate Russia, however harmful and unsustainable such a
course might be for Russia in the long term.  This policy could involve building up Russian
military forces to the extent possible and sharply increasing political, economic and even
military pressure against the Baltic states, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. 
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U.S. Policy
The Clinton Administration hailed the Founding Act as a step toward a Russia-NATO
partnership.  On July 3, 1997, President Clinton said that the Founding Act “would make
it crystal-clear that NATO is no longer an organization designed to contain Russia; NATO
is an organization designed to work with all free countries to respect the territorial
integrity of its members, to protect the security of its members, and to work with its
members and their allies — Russia, soon to be Ukraine, and those in the Partnership for
Peace — on common security problems like the problem in Bosnia.”  However, other
Administration officials have stressed that the Founding Act does not alter NATO’s core
mission of collective defense.  They say the Founding Act is an attempt by NATO to
engage Russia in a cooperative relationship but that NATO is “keeping its power dry” in
case of negative developments in Russia.  President Clinton has said that the new
consultative ties with Russia will give Moscow “a voice, but not a veto” in NATO
decisions.  Administration officials stress that the Act merely restates current NATO policy
on the deployment of foreign forces on the territory of new members, the adaptation of the
CFE Treaty to new realities in Europe, and on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on
the territory of new member states.  They assert that the Founding Act in no way limits the
rights and responsibilities of the new member states and that the door to NATO
membership remains open for the Baltic states and other countries not invited in this round
of enlargement.
Some critics of the Founding Act say that it will weaken NATO.  In a June 8, 1997
op-ed article in the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger said he was “gravely concerned”
that the Founding Act will dilute NATO into a “U.N.-style system of collective security”
by “grafting an elaborate and convoluted machinery for consultations with Russia at every
level of the alliance.”  Kissinger concedes that the Founding Act gives Russia no formal
veto over NATO decisions, since if the Permanent Joint Council is deadlocked on an issue,
the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s chief policymaking body), in which Russia does not
sit, could still act.  However, Kissinger warns that the NAC and the Permanent Joint
Council will tend to merge in practice, because countries will hesitate to meet without
Russia for fear of damaging ties with Moscow.  Kissinger urges the Senate in giving its
advice and consent to enlargement to make clear that nothing should detract from the
NAC as NATO’s chief policymaking body.  He adds that Congress should adopt a joint
resolution calling for the countries invited to become new NATO members to be admitted
to the Permanent Council while the ratification process is underway.
Some experts have questioned the advisability of NATO enlargement, in part because
of its effect on U.S. ties with Russia.  In a February 4, 1998 article, former Senators
Howard Baker and Sam Nunn, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and
Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Alton Frye said that, while the Founding Act
was "useful," continuing friction between the United States and Russia over enlargement
may squander "a critical window of opportunity to gain Russian cooperation in controlling
nuclear arsenals and preventing proliferation."  They advocate linking the pace of NATO
enlargement to the slower process of European Union (EU) enlargement.
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Congressional Concerns
On March 3, 1998, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved by a vote of
16-2 a resolution giving the Senate's advice and consent to the admission of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO (Treaty Doc. 105-36).  The resolution reflects
the desire of many Senators to rule out the possibility that the PJC could give Russia a de
facto veto over NATO decision-making.  It requires the President to certify that the
Founding Act and the PJC do not provide Russia a veto over NATO policy, or any role
in the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-making.  The President must also certify
that the PJC will not be used as a forum to negotiate "NATO's basic strategy, doctrine or
readiness" with Russia, nor "as a substitute for formal arms control negotiations" such as
the CFE adaptation talks.  He must certify that any discussion of NATO doctrine should
be for explanatory purposes only, and that the explanation should not be so detailed as to
compromise NATO's effectiveness.  The President must certify that no issue will be
discussed within the PJC before NATO's North Atlantic Council first adopts a common
position on the question.
In addition to questions over the PJC, there has been congressional debate over what
impact enlargement will have on relations with Russia.  In a February 24, 1998 letter to
their Senate colleagues, Senators William Roth, Richard Lugar, John McCain, Joseph
Biden, Joseph Lieberman, Chuck Hagel, Gordon Smith, Barbara Mikulski and Richard
Durbin said that enlargement will not threaten democracy in Russia, but will bolster it by
denying "nationalists and imperialist forces within Russia the legitimacy needed to thrive."
The  Senators said that enlargement will not isolate Russia because NATO is making
efforts, including through the Founding Act and peacekeeping cooperation in Bosnia, to
establish  an "enduring partnership" with Moscow.  Finally, countering the argument that
Russia will be less cooperative on arms control issues because of enlargement, the
Senators said that Russian foot-dragging on arms control started long before enlargement,
and is largely a product of internal Russian politics, not of enlargement.   
Senator Wellstone, who voted against the resolution, said that he is "very worried"
that enlargement could cause a "redivision of Europe."  He said that it could cause "a
poisoning of relations with Russia and ultranationalists coming into power."  Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan has said he will offer a floor amendment to the resolution barring
the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO until these countries
are first admitted to the EU.  Senator Moynihan has said that he is very concerned about
the impact of enlargement on Russia.  Senator John  Warner has said he  will offer a floor
amendment to delay a possible second round of enlargement for three years after the
current round is approved.  In a February 28  statement on the Senate floor, Senator
Warner expressed concerns that the U.S.-Russia relationship may be deteriorating at a time
when cooperation between the two countries on nuclear non-proliferation is a key U.S.
interest.   During floor debate on the enlargement resolution on March 18, he added that
enlargement may create an "iron ring" of countries facing Russia.
